Wow- it's been quite a few packed weeks since I last added to the blog, and I have a list of ideas for entries, but I'll start with the most recent idea and work backwards from there.
I was surprised today to be listening to our morning lecture (we call them charlas, or chats, which is actually a better name as we usually semi-casually discuss something, as opposed to having a formal lecture) and to suddenly think of a horseback riding metaphor to explain what we were talking about. I suppose horseback riding is probably the skill I've most practiced in my life, so it's inevitably part of my subconscious, but usually it doesn't occur to me to explain modern armed conflict through horses. Bear with me.
When you are cantering a horse, it will lead each step of the stride with one of the front legs- it will make contact first with one leg, then throw the other out in front. The second that lands, or the one in front, is called the lead leg. When a horse is cantering in a circle, to maintain balance, it has to lead with the inside leg. Thus, if you switch directions, you have to change leads. Often, you start out changing leads by bringing the horse down to a trot, then asking it to pick up the other lead. When you and your horse know each other, you can move on to a flying lead change, which is effectively switching the leading leg in the air, as the horse continues to canter. To ask, you have to gather the horse up- pull on the reins while keeping leg pressure on so it doesn't break stride, therefore helping the horse tighten and shorten the stride, until the key moment when you lift the outside rein and ask them to change. Most horses, when they feel the leg and rein pressure together, tilt their ears back and listen hard, bend their necks, slow down, gather their legs closer and closer- until, bam, you ask and they tilt their whole body up and flip the leading leg. Then the stride lengthens and you are back in the original stride, speeding around the corner.
It's quite beautiful, however, unfortunately I'm going to use it to describe a not-so-beautiful chain of events in Colombian modern armed conflict. This morning's charla effectively described a kind of lead-change in Colombian policy and conflict- not any profound or fundamental change, but rather a gathering up, a careful reorganization of the factors, a deluding vision of slowing down, peaceful processing- and then, most dangerously, a potential acceleration in the same conflict, but perhaps in a slightly different direction. A few themes that reinforce this assessment of the process:
1. From 2002 to 2006, Colombia's President Uribe effectively mirrored our President Bush's security vs. democracy strategy- that is to say, the ideology that sometimes, democratic principles must be sacrificed for the greater security of the state. Any organized, armed opposition to state was considered a terrorist group, and in Colombia, this definition was expanded to narco-terrorists, a category that included all the guerrilla groups. These groups were considered the ultimate enemies of the state, and security against insurgents/defeat of drug production was the most important role of the government. Both the governments of the US and Colombia have changed, in a strangely similar way. Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Obama are more subtle, and less overtly pro-force. Both have at least advanced political dialogue that acknowledges difference without condemning it, and appear to be trying to advance policies that at least discuss complexities beyond good/bad guys. However, they are still speaking the military-industrial complex language of a hammer as the answer to deeply, deeply rooted problems that include global inequality, drug demand meeting supply, and lack of economic options.
2. During Uribe's presidency, with heavy fumigation and intense military attacks on guerrilla groups, government statistics show a decrease in hectares of coca cultivation and in numbers of guerrilla members. However, alternate statistics point to advances in coca production per hectares (same quantity, more efficiency), and to little to no decrease in traffiking and processing. Also, guerrilla groups may have lost numbers, according the government statistics (which, due to the horrific 'false positives' scandal of Uribe's government- passing off probable assassinations of young people as guerrilla casualties-should be taken with a fistful of salt), but they have also gained territorial access. In a classic tactical response, they have run to the hills and dispersed both their numbers and tactics. They are certainly not giving up.
3. Paramilitaries- Uribe also mounted a demobilization campaign against the paramilitary groups (non-governmental, privatized armed groups, originally formed as security groups for large land owners and narcotraffikers). Supposedly, all but three pockets of paramilitaries demobilized. Regretfully, a new classification has emerged in the last few years- bandas criminales or criminal bands- considered isolated armed groups without a political agenda. A territorial map shows these groups acting in the exact same areas of Colombia as the 'demobilized' paramilitary groups. Also, over half of the elected Congress is currently under investigation for suspected links to the paramilitary money in the election process. The paramilitaries are also far from over.
4. Briefly- multinational involvement- especially with the supposed decrease/ change in the nature of the conflict, Colombia has been recently opening its doors to foreign investment. Mining, agribusiness, palm oil, and hosts of other multinationals have been courted by the government to come and invest in the industrial growth of the country. Unfortunately, this is also a continuation (or reconfiguration) of the historical pattern of land consolidation and holding by a very isolated and powerful elite, just the changing of names of the elites from Colombian family names to multinational business brands.
Remember that I am still in the exposure/understanding stage of this conflict, and these are some of my first thoughts. I am obviously ignorant of most of Colombian history and politics, but these are my first impressions with a little study. To me, this doesn't look like the root problems are anywhere near being resolved (or even examined). Instead, it looks like a momentary pause and re-assessment or re-strengthening of the various parties- to finish the metaphor, the gathering together before a big change in form. This armed conflict is morphing, evolving, growing or intensifying or becoming more subtle- but in any case it is far from coming to a halt. I'll keep reflecting on this theme as the months go on, so we'll see how my thoughts change.
I was surprised today to be listening to our morning lecture (we call them charlas, or chats, which is actually a better name as we usually semi-casually discuss something, as opposed to having a formal lecture) and to suddenly think of a horseback riding metaphor to explain what we were talking about. I suppose horseback riding is probably the skill I've most practiced in my life, so it's inevitably part of my subconscious, but usually it doesn't occur to me to explain modern armed conflict through horses. Bear with me.
When you are cantering a horse, it will lead each step of the stride with one of the front legs- it will make contact first with one leg, then throw the other out in front. The second that lands, or the one in front, is called the lead leg. When a horse is cantering in a circle, to maintain balance, it has to lead with the inside leg. Thus, if you switch directions, you have to change leads. Often, you start out changing leads by bringing the horse down to a trot, then asking it to pick up the other lead. When you and your horse know each other, you can move on to a flying lead change, which is effectively switching the leading leg in the air, as the horse continues to canter. To ask, you have to gather the horse up- pull on the reins while keeping leg pressure on so it doesn't break stride, therefore helping the horse tighten and shorten the stride, until the key moment when you lift the outside rein and ask them to change. Most horses, when they feel the leg and rein pressure together, tilt their ears back and listen hard, bend their necks, slow down, gather their legs closer and closer- until, bam, you ask and they tilt their whole body up and flip the leading leg. Then the stride lengthens and you are back in the original stride, speeding around the corner.
It's quite beautiful, however, unfortunately I'm going to use it to describe a not-so-beautiful chain of events in Colombian modern armed conflict. This morning's charla effectively described a kind of lead-change in Colombian policy and conflict- not any profound or fundamental change, but rather a gathering up, a careful reorganization of the factors, a deluding vision of slowing down, peaceful processing- and then, most dangerously, a potential acceleration in the same conflict, but perhaps in a slightly different direction. A few themes that reinforce this assessment of the process:
1. From 2002 to 2006, Colombia's President Uribe effectively mirrored our President Bush's security vs. democracy strategy- that is to say, the ideology that sometimes, democratic principles must be sacrificed for the greater security of the state. Any organized, armed opposition to state was considered a terrorist group, and in Colombia, this definition was expanded to narco-terrorists, a category that included all the guerrilla groups. These groups were considered the ultimate enemies of the state, and security against insurgents/defeat of drug production was the most important role of the government. Both the governments of the US and Colombia have changed, in a strangely similar way. Presidents Juan Manuel Santos and Obama are more subtle, and less overtly pro-force. Both have at least advanced political dialogue that acknowledges difference without condemning it, and appear to be trying to advance policies that at least discuss complexities beyond good/bad guys. However, they are still speaking the military-industrial complex language of a hammer as the answer to deeply, deeply rooted problems that include global inequality, drug demand meeting supply, and lack of economic options.
2. During Uribe's presidency, with heavy fumigation and intense military attacks on guerrilla groups, government statistics show a decrease in hectares of coca cultivation and in numbers of guerrilla members. However, alternate statistics point to advances in coca production per hectares (same quantity, more efficiency), and to little to no decrease in traffiking and processing. Also, guerrilla groups may have lost numbers, according the government statistics (which, due to the horrific 'false positives' scandal of Uribe's government- passing off probable assassinations of young people as guerrilla casualties-should be taken with a fistful of salt), but they have also gained territorial access. In a classic tactical response, they have run to the hills and dispersed both their numbers and tactics. They are certainly not giving up.
3. Paramilitaries- Uribe also mounted a demobilization campaign against the paramilitary groups (non-governmental, privatized armed groups, originally formed as security groups for large land owners and narcotraffikers). Supposedly, all but three pockets of paramilitaries demobilized. Regretfully, a new classification has emerged in the last few years- bandas criminales or criminal bands- considered isolated armed groups without a political agenda. A territorial map shows these groups acting in the exact same areas of Colombia as the 'demobilized' paramilitary groups. Also, over half of the elected Congress is currently under investigation for suspected links to the paramilitary money in the election process. The paramilitaries are also far from over.
4. Briefly- multinational involvement- especially with the supposed decrease/ change in the nature of the conflict, Colombia has been recently opening its doors to foreign investment. Mining, agribusiness, palm oil, and hosts of other multinationals have been courted by the government to come and invest in the industrial growth of the country. Unfortunately, this is also a continuation (or reconfiguration) of the historical pattern of land consolidation and holding by a very isolated and powerful elite, just the changing of names of the elites from Colombian family names to multinational business brands.
Remember that I am still in the exposure/understanding stage of this conflict, and these are some of my first thoughts. I am obviously ignorant of most of Colombian history and politics, but these are my first impressions with a little study. To me, this doesn't look like the root problems are anywhere near being resolved (or even examined). Instead, it looks like a momentary pause and re-assessment or re-strengthening of the various parties- to finish the metaphor, the gathering together before a big change in form. This armed conflict is morphing, evolving, growing or intensifying or becoming more subtle- but in any case it is far from coming to a halt. I'll keep reflecting on this theme as the months go on, so we'll see how my thoughts change.
Thanks for the analogy... I'm always impressed with your ability to isolate and convey the underlying trends in a situation. Keep it up! :)
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